

**Forum:** GA1

**Issue:** The question of the Iran nuclear power programme

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## Introduction

Iran's nuclear power programme was first initiated in 1957. Iran has formally renounced its nuclear weapons by signing key treaties, but despite this, its nuclear programme, which includes facilities and productive capabilities, is still seen as a possible threat to global security. State Actors and International Organisations like the UN put economic sanctions on the nation in order to compel Iran to curtail its nuclear programme and permit international inspections. The Iran Nuclear Deal Plan of Action, also known as JCPOA, an international nuclear agreement between Iran, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, China, and the Russian Federation, emerged in 2015 under the Obama administration, as a replacement for sanctions. Global praise for the agreement demonstrated that it is an agreement that peacefully limits Iran's nuclear capabilities. As a result, the agreement essentially removed the economic isolation and sanctions that had been placed on Iran over the preceding ten years. The agreement decided to replace Iran's reactors and give inspectors authority over all actions developed and deemed suspicious. It also laid out a 15-year plan for Iran to drastically reduce its uranium stockpile and convert its underground facilities into research centres and nuclear technology. The IAEA stated in 2016 that Iran has fulfilled its obligations under the agreement in order for its programme to continue peacefully.

The President of the USA, Donald Trump, formally declared the country's departure from the agreement in May 2018. He co-ordinated a plan to restore all sanctions on key areas of the Iranian economy that had been suspended, such as banking and essential oil industries. In addition, the JCPOA banned the other parties of the deal from denying a veto. Practically speaking, the agreement was cancelled, and there is a chance that Iran could become a nuclear threat in the future further destabilising the area and igniting a new crisis.

## Definition of Key Terms

### Nuclear weapon

A Nuclear weapon is a device designed to release energy in an explosive manner as a result of nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, or a combination of the two processes. Fission weapons are commonly referred to as atomic bombs. Fusion weapons are also referred to as thermonuclear bombs or, more commonly, hydrogen bombs; they are usually defined as nuclear weapons in which at least a portion of the energy is released by nuclear fusion.

### IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an intergovernmental organisation that seeks to

promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons. It was established in 1957 as an autonomous organisation within the United Nations system; though governed by its own founding treaty, the organisation reports to both the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, and is headquartered at the UN Office at Vienna, Austria.

### Uranium enrichment

Enriched uranium is a critical component for both civil nuclear power generation and military nuclear weapons. Natural uranium contains 0.7% of the U-235 isotope. The remaining 99.3% is mostly the U-238 isotope which does not contribute directly to the fission process. There are two types of uranium: high enriched (HEU) and low enriched (LEU).

### Non-Proliferation

The controlling of the spread of an amount of something, especially nuclear or chemical weapons. There is also the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was an agreement signed in 1968 by several of the major nuclear and non-nuclear powers that pledged their cooperation in stemming the spread of nuclear technology.

### Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs)

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones are an important regional approach to strengthening global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidating international efforts towards peace and security. Within the respective territories of the zones, the Treaties establishing NWFZs prohibit the acquisition, possession, placement, testing and use of such weapons. There are currently five NWFZs, covering territories in most of the Southern Hemisphere and in Central Asia.

### The E3

The E3 is an informal foreign and security cooperation arrangement between the UK, Germany and France.

## Background

A number of events have happened since the 1960s that have aided in the establishment of a nuclear non-proliferation system. Beginning with President Eisenhower's speech to the UN General Assembly, which advocated for the establishment of an international organisation for atomic energy under "the umbrella" of the UN, with the authority to regulate the production and distribution of fissile material solely for the benefit of humanity's peaceful endeavours, such as energy and scientific research. In response to the UN member states' "Atoms for Peace speech," the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was founded in 1957 with the goal of ensuring "the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and well-being across the world." The IAEA and countries looking to build nuclear programmes enter into bilateral and multilateral security agreements that govern the Agency's operations. A cooperation agreement for the generation of nuclear energy was reached with the United States in 1957.

The Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) was established in 1967, ten years later, under the aegis of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI), adhering to the main principles of the Agreement. A

5-megawatt US reactor running on enriched uranium was installed at the TNRC. One year later, Iran signed and authorised the NP agreement. Control over Iran's nuclear programme is governed by IAEA obligations and lastly, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by Iran in 1970. Iran completed its plans in 1974 with assistance from the US to construct 23 nuclear power stations by the year 2000 and a directive on Iran's acquisition of a US reprocessing unit for the extraction of plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel was signed by US President Gerald Ford in 1976. The Iranian Revolution began in 1979 and more specifically the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979) and the subsequent creation of Islamic democracy in Iran. The primary causes of the Iranian people's uprising against the regime were the harsh secret police that controlled everything as well as the Shah program's Western tendencies, and unchecked corruption. Consequently, the US halted its dealings with Iran. In an effort to calm Western fears, Iran announced at the end of 1990 that it would honour its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty while also resuming its nuclear programme in collaboration with North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia.

### Potential Weaponization of Iran's nuclear power programme

In 2002 Iranian exiles revealed the existence of a covert nuclear programme. The revelation matched American concerns about weapons of mass destruction finding their way to extremist networks and renegade states. Iran decided to halt the production of enriched uranium on October 21, 2003, by monitoring IAEA inspectors, in order to evade the application of international sanctions. At the same time, negotiations with France and Germany were initiated. While negotiating an agreement on the peaceful purpose of its nuclear programmes, France, Germany, the UK, and Iran reaffirmed the text of the conditions of October 21, 2003. This occurred in November of 2004. In 2006 Iran declared that negotiations would stop and that the enriched uranium process would resume in Natanz. On September 12, 2011, the Bushehr reactor, Iran's first nuclear power facility, officially began operating. Along with pursuing the establishment of more medium-sized nuclear and uranium mines, Iran has announced the establishment of a new nuclear power station at Darkhovin. The six major powers—the US, France, Britain, Russia, China, and Germany—reached an agreement in Geneva in November 2013 to temporarily halt Iran's nuclear programme for a period of six months in exchange for a seven billion dollar lift on Western sanctions. The agreement does not acknowledge Iran's ability to enrich uranium, even though Iran is required to fulfil its responsibilities under the IAEA. The above countries, Iran included, also signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Geneva on July 14, 2015, and it came into effect on January 16, 2016. In exchange for the gradual lifting of international sanctions against Iran, the JCPOA grants international control over the country's nuclear programme.

International reactions sparked by the US President Donald Trump's announcement in May 2018 that the US would be pulling out of the international agreement from 2015 and would be reimposing sanctions on Iran. Iran complied entirely with its responsibilities, according to the UN Security Council, the US intelligence services, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, breaking the Iranian nuclear accord poses a greater risk. If the other signatories can offer sufficient commercial and investment rewards, Iran might decide to stay in the pact, but given that the US may apply harsh sanctions on

international companies doing business with Iran, this is unlikely to happen. With the intention of reducing Iran's missile and nuclear programme as well as destabilising its role in the Middle East by supporting troops in Yemen, Syria, and Libya, the US announced a series of additional sanctions against Iran on November 5, 2018. In July of 2019 Iran accelerated uranium production and later on in November, it started using the Fordo plant to enrich uranium. Constructed inside a mountain and heavily defended, the facility was meant to be used for research purposes under the JCPOA, not as an actual enrichment site. During the end of November the IAEA confirmed that Iran had exceeded the limit of their heavy water supply and enriched uranium stockpile by 372.3 kilograms [28]. In 2020, Iran declared that it will not comply with limitations on research and development, enriched material stockpile size, enrichment percentage, or capacity for uranium enrichment and by the end of 2020, according to the IAEA, Iran reportedly had 2,443 kilogrammes of low-enriched uranium, which is around 12 times more than the JCPOA limit [28]. During 2021, Iran installed multiple new cascades of advanced centrifuges and its enriched uranium percentages kept rising. By 2022, Iran had accumulated more than eighteen times the permitted quantity of enriched uranium under the terms of the 2015 nuclear agreement which was deemed as an unprecedented advance by a UN nuclear watchdog. Lastly, in 2023 since the latest quarterly IAEA report, Iran has accumulated 87.5 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, a 40% increase. It had 3,760.8 kg of enriched uranium in total inventory [28]. On March 4, 2023, Iran promised to assist a U.N. investigation into uranium traces at three unreported sites that go back to a clandestine programme before 2003, following years of delay. Tehran additionally pledged to replace the cameras and other monitoring equipment that was taken out of nuclear plants in June 2022. The aforementioned cameras were reinstalled during May of the same year.

### Potential benefits of Iran's nuclear power programme

There are several countries that could benefit from Iran's nuclear deal such as China, Russia and India. As far as China is concerned, even though supporters of a new Iran deal assert that it will isolate Tehran's nuclear programme, freeing up Washington and its allies to confront Beijing's increasing power in the Indo-Pacific, a weakened, shorter pact that can greatly strengthen Iran's power will have the opposite effect, allowing China to expand its influence throughout the Persian gulf and increase the instability in the Middle East and Indo-Pacific. Iran has been economically and diplomatically sidelined for years due to harsh international sanctions, and Tehran is now looking to other dictatorial governments for further help. This includes its alliance with China, which in recent times, has emerged as Iran's principal trading partner, a top destination for energy exports, and a significant investor in Iranian businesses. The two countries also engage in military exchanges and joint exercises (sino-iranian deal). With sanctions no longer a threat, China is likely to increase trade and investment in Iran, expanding its influence throughout the country and the wider region. The impact of China's expanded access will be felt most strongly in a few strategically important industries, many of which have major implications for national security. For example, state-owned China National Petroleum Company withdrew from a multibillion-dollar agreement to develop natural gas in the world's largest gas deposit, the South Pars field, in 2019 due to U.S.

sanctions. It is likely that Chinese companies will reevaluate the feasibility of this and other profitable energy projects, some of which are under the military authority of Iran. China, which has already made investments in various materials processing projects that allowed Iran to generate feedstock for its missile programme, will also increase its influence throughout the steel, gold, and aluminium industries in Iran. The same holds true for initiatives related to transport and infrastructure that seek to link Iran to China's regional networks throughout South and Central Asia. This includes the Xinjiang province of China and Iran's proposed train line. The fact that Iran will benefit financially from any new agreement that is reached should be taken into account.. According to financial modelling, Tehran may be able to access frozen funds worth \$275 billion in the first year of the agreement and at least \$1 trillion in additional oil revenue by 2030 [26].

Russia is also a prime example of a country that has been working closely with Iran for years. More specifically, Iran and Russia have worked together on nuclear, energy, economic, and military initiatives. Tehran has frequently expressed frustration over Moscow's poor agreement implementation but in response to pressure from the West, the two have become closer. Moscow and Tehran have collaborated to get past US sanctions. They allegedly worked together to sell oil to Syria—which is similarly subject to US sanctions—at least since 2014. To make up for their withdrawal from SWIFT, the international financial network that processes daily transactions worth billions of dollars, the two nations connected their banking networks in January 2023. Russia has increased its investments in Iran's energy and transportation infrastructure, particularly its ports and highways. Russia's Gazprom and Iran's National Iranian Oil Company agreed to a \$40 billion deal in 2022, under which Gazprom will develop six oil fields, two natural gas fields, pipelines, and other infrastructure. Russia surpassed China as the largest foreign investor in Iran by 2023. For many years, Iran and Russia have worked together on nuclear technology. A West German company began construction on the Bushehr nuclear power plant in the 1970s under the shah, but the project was abandoned following the revolution of 1979. Tehran asked Moscow for assistance in 1995 to complete the building of a nuclear reactor. The reactor eventually began to operate in 2011, but Russia's years-long delays infuriated Iran. A lot of Iranians have been hesitant to enhance relations with Moscow. However, additional involvement could cause public opinion to change. In an effort to promote travel, the two nations have eliminated the need for visas. Iranians were granted visa-free entry to Russia for a maximum of six months at the beginning of 2023. All in all, Russia's potential benefits from a new nuclear power deal include the opportunity to offer technical assistance to Iran, aiming at gaining access to new markets and strengthening its economic ties with it. This could involve helping Iran develop its nuclear infrastructure, improve its nuclear technology, and enhance its nuclear capabilities. Russia, being a country having a rich technical expertise, can boost Iran in bringing its nuclear program back to full compliance with the nuclear deal. Russia aims at potentially securing a long-term business relationship and generating revenue from future nuclear projects in Iran, a country whose strategic location may offer them uncountable economic opportunities. Such a collaboration between the two countries may also lead to further technology transfers and training opportunities, benefiting both.

Another country to consider is India. Tehran has been able to resume regular trade with other

nations because of the historic nuclear agreement reached between Iran and the main international powers. However, prior to the agreement being made, and in spite of the severe sanctions, India was one of the few nations conducting billion-dollar business with Iran. With the aim of reviving its strategic and economic relationship with Tehran, Delhi will be greatly impacted by the easing of the sanctions. Currently, India and Iran trade about \$14 billion (£8.96 billion), with Tehran benefiting greatly from the trade balance. Last year, India sent goods worth almost \$4.2 billion to Iran [5]. India's aspirations to establish a presence in the region are greatly aided by Iran's advantageous location as a gateway to Central Asia. A contract to construct the port of Chabahar in southern Iran was inked by the two nations. Two of the port's current berths will be leased by Indian companies, who will operate them as cargo terminals for both containers and other uses. It is expected to offer a new commercial route to Central Asia once it is operational. Ultimately, India already benefits and will continue to benefit from Iran.

## Major Countries and Organisations Involved

### The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

The Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is a landmark accord reached between Iran and several world powers (USA, France, China, Russia, UK) including the United States, in July 2015. Under its terms, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and open its facilities to more extensive international inspections in exchange for billions of dollars' worth of sanctions relief.

Proponents of the deal claimed that it would lessen the probability of hostilities between Iran and its regional enemies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, and help avoid the resuscitation of Iran's nuclear weapons programme. The P5+1 had been in negotiations with Iran for years prior to the JCPOA, providing its leadership with a range of incentives to stop enriching uranium. Following the election of Hassan Rouhani in 2013, who was perceived as a reformist, the parties reached a preliminary accord to direct talks towards a broader agreement. According to a number of experts, in all likelihood, the agreement would have accomplished that goal for more than ten years if all sides had kept their promises. The UN Security Council may decide whether to extend the lifting of sanctions against Iran if any signatory believes that country is breaking the agreement. The UN sanctions are scheduled to be permanently lifted after this ten-year mechanism expires. All in all, the JCPOA has been really helpful throughout the years.

### International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

The IAEA from the off-set is fully aware of Iran's nuclear power programme and continues to closely monitor the situation and serves as a mediator for the diplomatic discussions surrounding the issue. They have also released several resolutions and statements regarding the country's nuclear power programme with the last one released on the 17th of November 2022 (GOV/22/70).

### Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

During the 2012 annual session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, which took place in Monaco, the Organisation passed a "Resolution on Iran's nuclear programme". The resolution's primary goal was to guarantee and solidify member states' willingness to follow the UNSC decisions and carry on

their pursuit of a long-term deal with Iran. The OSCE recalls the NPT and emphasises that Iran and the other member states of the organisation have equal responsibility for the peaceful use of nuclear materials and energy in an attempt to fully abide by other international accords. The OSCE has 57 participating States from Europe, Central Asia and North America.

## Timeline of Events

Date	Name	Description
November, 1967	First Nuclear Reactor	Iran's first nuclear reactor operates on uranium enriched to about 93%, which was converted to run on 20% in 1993.
1970's	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT)</li> <li>• Atomic Energy Organization of Iran(AEOI)</li> <li>• Nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel cycle</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Iranian parliament ratifies the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).</li> <li>2. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) is established.</li> <li>3. Plans are announced aiming at the construction of 23 nuclear power plants and the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle.</li> </ol>
1980's	Main events	The US Department of State adds Iran to its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
1990's	Iran – Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992	Congress passes the Iran – Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, which prohibits the transfer of technology that might contribute to Iran's proliferation of sophisticated conventional weapons.
2002	Main events	The National Council of Resistance on Iran declares that Iran has built nuclear facilities near Natanz and Iraq.
2003	Suspension of uranium-enrichment activities and IAEA nuclear activity protocol	Iran agrees to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities and ratify an additional protocol requiring Iran to provide an account of its nuclear activities and grant the IAEA access to nuclear sites in the country.

2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN Security Council</li> <li>• Resolution 1696</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The IAEA Board of Governors refers Iran to the UN Security Council.</li> <li>2. The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1696, making the IAEA's cause for Iran to suspend its enrichment program.</li> </ol>
2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Intelligence Estimate</li> <li>• Nuclear weaponry estimate</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The United States publicises an unclassified summary of a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report on Iran's nuclear program.</li> <li>2. According to NIE, Iran was believed to be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon between 2010 and 2015.</li> </ol>
2009	Geneva Council	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Iran met with permanent members of the Security Council in Geneva to discuss Iran's nuclear program.</li> <li>2. The early October talks in Geneva on the transfer of Iran's low-enriched uranium were continued in Vienna with the presence of the IAEA.</li> <li>3. The United States and Russia approved the agreement but Iran did not follow suit due to domestic opposition.</li> </ol>
2010	Resolution 1929	The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1929, imposing another round of sanctions in Iran. Iran met in Geneva with members of the UN Security Council and Germany for negotiations over Iran's nuclear program.
2011	Nuclear activity report	The IAEA releases a report detailing a range of activities related to nuclear weapon development in which Iran is suspected to have engaged as part of a structured program prior to 2004.
2013	Negotiations over nuclear program	Iran and the P5 +1 resumed negotiations in Kazakhstan over Iran's nuclear program. Iran is offered an updated proposal based mostly on the 2012 package.



2014	Joint Plan of Action	Iran and the P5+1 meet for a third time in Geneva to discuss implementation. They announce that implementation of the Joint Plan of Action will begin in January.
2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nuclear deal parameters agreement</li> <li>• IAEA Board of Governors meeting</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Talks between the P5+1 and Iran continue in Lausanne. An agreement is announced on a general framework that outlines the broad parameters of a nuclear deal.</li> <li>2. The IAEA Board of Governors holds a meeting to consider the December 2 report on Iran's weaponization activities. The Board requests that the IAEA continue reporting on Iran's nuclear activities under the nuclear deal.</li> </ol>
2016	Main events	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. IAEA confirmed that Iran has completed the required steps to begin implementing the nuclear deal. A number of sanctions have been lifted or suspended by the US, EU, and the UN.</li> <li>2. With Russian assistance, Iran started building its second nuclear power plant—the first since the final nuclear deal.</li> </ol>
2017	Main events	Iran's compliance with the JCPOA received recognition by the Trump Administration, which also kept lifting sanctions pertaining to nuclear energy. However, the administration simultaneously declared new sanctions against Iran's ballistic missile program.
2018	Main events	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Iran lied about never having a nuclear weapons program.</li> <li>2. The United States withdrew from JCPOA. Trump declared that he would reinstate the sanctions against Iran that the JCPOA had suspended.</li> <li>3. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insisted that the UN update Resolution 2231 to prohibit Iran from creating ballistic missiles with nuclear capability.</li> </ol>

2019	Main events	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Vice President Mike Pence demanded that the United States' European allies leave the JCPOA.</li> <li>2. The United States sanctioned several individuals and entities involved in Iran's past nuclear weapons program as well as imports of enriched uranium from Iran.</li> <li>3. President Rouhani announced that Iran would stop complying with parts of the 2015 nuclear deal and said that the country would resume stockpiling excess uranium and heavy water used in its nuclear reactors.</li> <li>4. Iran breached the terms of the 2015 nuclear deal by exceeding limits on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium and announced that it would begin enriching uranium past the 3.67% limit set by the 2015 nuclear deal.</li> </ol>
2020	Main events	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Iran announced that it would no longer abide by restrictions on uranium enrichment imposed by the 2015 nuclear deal.</li> <li>2. Trump called on the remaining parties to the 2015 nuclear deal – Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia – to withdraw from the agreement and work towards a new more comprehensive one.</li> </ol>
2021	Main events	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Iran threatened to block IAEA snap inspections if the U.S. did not lift sanctions.</li> <li>2. The IAEA and Iran agreed on a compromise that would provide the nuclear watchdog less access to the country's declared and undeclared nuclear sites. Under the arrangement, the nuclear watchdog could not access cameras installed at declared nuclear sites but Iran would be required to save all surveillance footage for three months.</li> <li>3. Indirect talks over getting the United States and Iran back into compliance with the JCPOA resumed in Vienna.</li> </ol>
2022	Main events	<p>The IAEA's Board of Governors, led by the United States, Britain, France, and Germany passed a resolution criticising Iran over unexplained traces of uranium.</p>

2023	Main events	After years of stonewalling, Iran pledged on March 4, 2023 to cooperate with a U.N. probe into traces of uranium at three undeclared sites that date back to a covert program before 2003. Tehran also promised to reinstall monitoring equipment, including cameras, that had been removed from nuclear facilities in June 2022.
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## Relevant UN Treaties and Events

- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, 2004
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737, 23 December 2006 (S/RES/1737)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747, 24 March 2007 (S/RES/1747)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, 09 June 2010 (S/RES/1929)
- United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 3 December 2012 (A/RES/67/56)
- United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 5 December 2013 (A/RES/68/46)
- United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 2 December 2014 (A/RES/69/41)
- United Nations Security Resolution 2231, 20 July 2015 (S/RES/2231)
- United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 7 December 2015 (A/RES/70/33)
- United Nations General Assembly Resolution, 23 December 2016 (A/RES/71/258)
- The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) signed on the 20th of September 2017

## Previous Attempts to solve the Issue

[25] The UN adopted sanctions in response to Iran's announcement on July 19, 2011, which stated that it was developing a new enriched uranium plant and intending to establish a new uranium enrichment centre in Qom. These sanctions include:

1. a ban on Iranian investment in areas sensitive to nuclear weapons,
2. a prohibition on the sale of major arms systems to Iran,
3. a ban on ballistic missile technology related to nuclear weapons
4. increasingly stricter restrictions on Iranian international finance as well as travel and asset restrictions for Iranian organisations.

## Possible Solutions

**Parties who have expressed concerns about the potential weaponization of Iran's nuclear power programme (E3 and IAEA):**

There are many viable plans of action that delegates could suggest and analyse for these actors, two of them being the following. The first one focuses on further deterrence that can be established by implementing sanctions, which have proved to be successful in averting Iran from developing nuclear

weaponry. The second one involves enabling further cooperation by means of treaties and alliances, which focus on monitoring and inspecting the development of Iran's nuclear programme. In order to ensure Iran's agreement on these treaties, it may be necessary that nuclear-related sanctions be lifted so as to pave the way for collaboration.

#### **Parties who benefit from the potential uses of Iran's nuclear power programme:**

Considering Iran's past unpredictability, countries who are willing to ally with Iran such as Russia, China and India aim to increase the accountability towards Iran by creating alliances with it that further their cooperation and form trade partnerships. These alliances ensure a relation of mutual dependency that could stabilise the region. This can also be achieved by establishing more formal agencies that also focus on inspections, monitoring Iran's nuclear technology following the example of the IAEA.

#### **Countries that are directly affected by the uncontrollable use of Iran's nuclear power programme:**

Several neighbouring countries who are in alliance with Iran such as Iraq and Syria are in favour of a lift of nuclear-related sanctions and pro the further development of the Iran nuclear programme with some sort of monitoring. Their focus is centred around empowering their alliance with Iran and ensuring additional deterrence so as to ensure protection over their conflicted borders.

Regarding the neighbouring countries with tensions with Iran such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Israel, these countries are against the further development of the Iran nuclear programme due to the fear of creating power instability in the region. There are two possible solutions that these countries can agree with: imposition of further sanctions to ensure total discouragement of the costly development of nuclear weapons or removal of sanctions in return of allowing these other countries to continue their own development of nuclear weapons while enforcing a well-established monitoring programme in which all parties participate (e.g. inspections from IAEA).

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